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APPLYING BIOETHICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
PRINCIPLISM OR SITUATIONISM?
George P. Smith, II*
INTRODUCTION
Living in a Nation that embraces pluralism (also referred to as relativism)
results, for some, in an acknowledgment that no one perspective is superior
to another in seeking resolutions to moral issues.1 Making pragmatic
decisions conditioned and shaped from similar real-life experiences2 should
be, on balance, the preferred ethical analytical template. Choosing one
theoretical and philosophical construct as a framework for decision-making
depends largely upon an individual’s system of personal beliefs and values.
Indeed, it has been suggested that moral beliefs are determined by cultures;3
and thus, the “truth or falsity of an ethical claim is relative to a particular
culture.”4
	
  
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University School of Law. LL.D., Indiana University;
LL.M., Columbia University; J.D., B.S., Indiana University. Parts of this Article are
drawn from my book, LAW AND BIOETHICS: INTERSECTIONS ALONG THE MORTAL COIL
(2012). The research for and the writing of this Article were undertaken in June 2013,
when I was a Visiting Fellow at The Lauterpacht Center, University of Cambridge, and in
July-August 2013 when I was a Visiting Scholar at The Hesburgh Center for Civil and
Human Rights, University of Notre Dame. This Article is dedicated—with respect,
admiration, and appreciation—to the memory of Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., valued
friend and cherished mentor from whom I learned much of the meaning of life and the
place of Bioethics in contemporary society.
1. JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL ETHICS AND LAW 37 (4th ed. 2012).
2. Id. at 38.
3. Nancy S. Jecker, Applying Ethical Reasoning: Philosophical, Clinical and
Cultural Challenges in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND
PRACTICES 127, 130-31 (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R. Jensen & Robert A. Pearlman eds.,
3d ed. 2012). See James Rachels, The Challenge of Cultural Relativism, in BIOETHICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICES 118 passim (Nancy S.
Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen & Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2nd ed. 2007).
4. Jecker, supra note 3, at 128. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes moral standards
from ethical standards by defining the former as prescribing how others are treated and
the latter as those standards by which individuals live their personal lives. Ronald
Dworkin, What Is a Good Life?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/feb/10/what-goodlife/?pagination=false&printpage=true. He acknowledges that others do not maintain this
distinction, however, and—instead—hold that morality includes ethics and vice versa. Id.
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It has been asserted that all cultures are infused with a central or common
core which, in turn, is drawn essentially from the four cardinal principles of
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice, which codify
principlism.5 Ethical judgments are justified when they frame one of these
four principles.6 Others contend that all four principles work in tandem—to
one degree or other—in ethical argumentation which accords rational
judgment.7 When a judgment is made autonomously with informed consent,
it confers a benefit, and does not cause harm and is just or fair; it is
efficacious.8
As a process for moral reasoning, principlism posits that particular
judgments are justified by moral rules which are justified by cardinal
principles which in turn are justified, ultimately, by ethical theories.9 Ethics
is seen as prescriptive and, consequently, directs its focus to resolving one
central question—what ought to be?10 Whether these four principles are
seen generally as independent principles of obligated or as in competition
with each other has been advanced as a serious defect of principlism itself.11
Applying one or more of the principles to any particular case is too
discretionary and leads to a “tension-ridden dialectic.”12

	
  
See Ruth Benedict, A Defense of Ethical Relativism in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICES 111 passim (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen,
& Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2d ed. 2007).
5. Jecker, supra note 3, at 130.
6. Id. at 131. Indeed, such a judgment may be seen as both rational and reasonable.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 337 passim (8th ed. 2011).
7. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE 17-40
(2008); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD 6-9 (1993).
8. Id. See Paul Ramsey, The Case of The Curious Exception, in NORM AND
CONTEXT IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS (Gene H. Outka & Paul Ramsey eds., 1968) (studying
when a justifiable violation of moral principles or moral values is allowed and concluding
that there is only a relative distinction between principles and rules—not a clear one). Id.
at 74.
9. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 5
(2nd ed. 1983).
10. Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776
(1971).
11. K. Danner Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism in BIOETHICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 153, 157 (Nancy S. Jecker,
Albert R. Jonsen & Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2nd ed. 2007).
12. Daniel Callahan, Bioethics as a Discipline in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICES 17, 22 (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen &
Robert A. Pearlman eds., 2nd ed. 2007); see Larry Churchill, Are We Professionals? A
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This Article will propose isolating one of the four bioethical principles—
beneficence—and reinterpreting it as the virtue of love and, as such, the sole
criterion to determine the ethical propriety of decision-making or, the
efficacy of, moral argumentation. Accordingly, actions that, under any
circumstance, exhibit a “caring response” (i.e. compassion, mercy, love,
benevolence and common sense) should be accepted as ethical and
rational.13 Consequently, when one’s intentions to act are anchored in love,
they are tested by the facts of each situation which demand their application.
Rather than being tethered to the subtleties and complexities of principlism,
situationism requires that the policy or course of action dealing with a
particular ethical dilemma be “tested” as to its morality (and rationality) by
determining whether that action is undertaken with a humane and merciful
purpose.14
No doubt, one of the most dramatic—and today quite common—
occurrences which trigger responses and present moral dilemmas is end-oflife care.15 To either initiate or continue treatment which is medically futile
should be seen as unethical and, indeed, wrong.16 Such a course of action
not only denies human finitude, but it imposes unnecessary effort, financial
expenses, and emotional trauma on both the patient and other affected third
parties. When physicians attempt to treat futile medical conditions,17 such

	
  
Critical Look at the Social Role of Bioethicists, 128 DAEDALUS 253, 255 (1990) (arguing
bioethical disputations are disregarded by “ordinary people” because they are either
deemed as irrelevant to real issues of health care they confront and/or remote from their
value systems).
13. George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care:
Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 519
passim (2011). See Joseph Fletcher, Love is The Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEAL 427
(1966). See also Michael Kirby, The New Biology and International Sharing—Lessons
From the Life and Work of George P. Smith, II, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL STUDS. 425, 432 (2000).
14. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY (1966).
15. George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas
in Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47 (1987). See George P.
Smith, II, Gently Into the Good Night: Toward a Compassionate Response to End-Stage
Illness, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 101 (2013).
16. George P. Smith, II, Utility and The Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding
Autonomy and The Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (1996).
17. Id. See George P. Smith, II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating
a Right to a Good Death, 7 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382 (1998).

40

The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Vol. XXX:1

actions are a total abnegation of one of the cardinal principles of medical
ethics—beneficence.18
I. BIOETHICS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence that sets it
apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from
a de facto set of issues interrelated by what might be termed “family
resemblance.” While a common thread joining all of the issues is
exceedingly difficult to find, the central core comprising the list of these
issues—without question—is a felt concern over the technology of control
of man’s body, his mind, and quality of life.
In a very real sense, bioethics encompasses a whole political movement
which seeks to harness political forces to deal with a plethora of ethical
problems relating to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro
level of economic distribution.19 Consequently, many of the concerns of
bioethics are ones of public policy—or with legislation, and policy
guidelines at state, local and federal levels—that need to be enacted and
enforced with respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set.
Bioethical concerns may be understood as those prohibitions all rational
people urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common
agreement exists.
Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another, at
the broader societal level of moral acceptability, a democratic consensus
must be reached acknowledging that a certain good must be promoted,
though its promotion causes some degree of harm elsewhere in society. It is
within this setting where much of what is recognized as “bioethics” is

	
  
18. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID S. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S OWN
GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE (1988). See Edmund D.
Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life: The Use and Abuse of The Concept of Futility in
THE DIGNITY OF THE DYING PERSON 219, 233-35 (Juan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio
Segreccia eds., 2000). See also Ramsey, supra note 8.
19. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of The Law, 24 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 16 (1994). See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND NUISANCE LAW 17 (1992) (observing that, in the distribution of resources,
economics is concerned with efficiency instead of fairness); see also George J. Annas,
The Dominance of American Law (And Market Values) Over American Bioethics in
META MEDICAL ETHICS: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF BIOETHICS 83-96 (Michael
A. Grodin ed., 2001). See also ROGER DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 5-7, 11 (1997); George P. Smith, II, Biotechnology and
The Law: Social Responsibility v. Freedom of Scientific Inquiry, 39 MERCER L. REV. 437
(1988).
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focused. While individual morality operates primarily within a system of
restraints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where
promotion of good is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes:
what goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)? Of necessity
priorities, values, and goods must be weighed, balanced, and compared.
Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are
assessed, it is well to remember that those very elements in the balancing
test are based upon value judgments, with the ultimate goal being the
formulation and validation of a final action, which—consistent with art
utilitarianism—minimizes human suffering and maximizes the social good.20
If the pace of scientific advancement is not measured and approached
rationally, a principle of precaution may well become a principle of
paralysis.21
II. EXPANDING THE OUTREACH
As a discipline or field of research and study, bioethics emerged in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s as an effort to assess, critically, “the
significance of medicine in terms of its conceptual and value assumptions,”22
and as a response to medical paternalism.23 Today, bioethics is commonly
	
  
20. These ideas are drawn from GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW
supra note 7 and George P. Smith, II, Biomedicine and Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De
Lege Ferenda, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 237 (1993). See POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, § 8.7; infra note 69 and the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS test for unreasonable conduct. See generally Norman Daniels,
Ezekiel J. Emmanuel & Bruce Jennings, Is Justice Enough? Ends and Means in
Bioethics, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9 (1996).
21. See e.g., Rob Stein & Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Blocks Stem Cell Rules, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 2010, at A1. See also George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in
The Age of Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 34 (1999); Richard
Delgado & David R. Millin, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional
Protection for Scientific Inquiry, in ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A
BRAVE NEW WORLD ch. 10 (George P. Smith, II ed., 1982).
22. H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., BIOETHICS AND SECULAR HUMANISM: THE
SEARCH FOR A COMMON MORALITY 10 (1991). George J. Annas argues the catalyst for
the development of American Bioethics was the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trials after World
War II and the Nuremberg Code. AMERICAN BIOETHICS AFTER NUREMBERG:
PRAGMATISM, POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2005).
23. See Laurence B. McCullough, Was Bioethics Founded on Historical and
Conceptual Mistakes about Medical Paternalism? 25 BIOETHICS 66 (2011). See
generally THE STORY OF BIOETHICS (Jennifer K. Walter & Eran P. Klein eds., 2003);
George P. Smith, II, Procreational Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis
for a Brave New World, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 635 (1986).
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understood as focusing on ethical and legal controversies arising from the
delivery of healthcare, the practice of medicine, and on biomedical
research.24
What originally were acknowledged as the three fundamental principles
undergirding the field of bioethics—Autonomy, Beneficence, and
Justice25—have, for some, been expanded to include one or more of the
following: Non-Malfeasance, which holds to the premise that one held to a
duty of care that forbids the infliction of evil, harm, or risk, or harm on
others; Confidentiality, which imposes a standard of non-disclosure of
information received by one person to another with the promise of its
secrecy; Distributive Justice (refined from the earlier designation as Justice)
to include a mandate that benefits and burdens of any medical resource
allocation should not only be distributed equitably but that scarce resources
be distributed fairly and—furthermore—that no one person or group receive
a disproportionate share of either benefits or burdens; and Truth Telling, a
principle which demands honesty and integrity in the disclosure of all
information about an individual to that individual, himself.26
Moving from principlism to utilitarian, Kantian theories, and Natural Law
teachings, today, new approaches to understanding and applying bioethical
theory have been posited. They include: narrative bioethics; virtue bioethics;
ethics of caring; religious bioethics; casuistry; pragmatism; law and
economic theory; critical race theory; and feminist bioethics.27 There is an
obvious overlap among all of these approaches. Indeed, most bioethical
decision-making is based either on the foundational principles of this
discipline or a combination of these approaches.28
As bioethical principles and analytical approaches to understanding and
applying bioethics to decision-making and policy have expanded over the
years, so too has the scope of it as a discipline. One such ranking of
contemporary bioethics includes within it the study of: end of life care
(which includes aging and dementia); genetics; research ethics; global

	
  
24. RONALD A. LINDSAY, FUTURE BIOETHICS: OVERCOMING TABOOS, MYTHS &
DOGMAS 19 (2008). See generally BIOETHICS CRITICALLY RECONSIDERED: HAVING
SECOND THOUGHTS (H. Tristram Englehardt ed., 2012).
25. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS (1992).
26. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNDON, TIMOTHY S.
JOST & ROBERT SCHWARTZ, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 4 (6th ed. 2008).
See generally TOM W. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (6th ed. 2009); ETHICS AND LAW FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSION chs. 1, 2, 5 (Ian
Kerridge, Michael Lowe & Cameron Stewart eds., 3rd ed. 2009).
27. FURROW, supra note 26, at 11-14.
28. Id. at 14.
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international health issues; cloning and stem cells; organ transplants; ethics
of public health; feminism (i.e., commodification of female reproduction);
technology; disability; and ecogenetics.29 In another such ranking, seven
other activities were listed as inclusive of contemporary bioethics: patientcentered care; evidence-based medicine and pay for performance;
community dialogue; cross cultural concerns of race and health disparities;
and new technologies.30 Interestingly, religion and sociobiology are both
absent from these listings.31
III. BENEFICENCE AND BENEVOLENCE
The guiding norm of medicine has been the duty of beneficence.32 As a
codified or operational principle, beneficence “prompts physicians to cite
their moral commitments and personal support for patients beyond just
respecting their rights” of autonomy.33 Over recent years, however, there has
been a significant shift in reverential application of beneficence to an
enshrinement of autonomy34—anchored, as such, in the Doctrine of
Informed Consent—as the foundational or operative bioethical principle
with which to comport in decision-making.35

	
  
29. This ranking is drawn by Howard Brody from his assessment of the OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS (Bonnie Steinbook ed., 2007). See generally HOWARD BRODY,
THE FUTURE OF BIOETHICS 7 (2009).
30. In this list Brody enumerates the area that he thinks should be included in a
reformulated discipline of Bioethics. Id. at 4. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN
BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH LAW BOUNDARIES (2005).
31. See BRODY, supra note 29.
32. Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma, The Conflict Between Autonomy
and Beneficence in Medical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 23 (1987).
33. Id. at 45.
34. Id. at 23. See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Promise of Beneficence Model for
Medical Ethics, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 145, 155 (1990) (analyzing the
tensions between autonomy and beneficence and acknowledging the moral correctness of
Dr. Pellegrino’s argument on behalf and defense of beneficence yet asserting the
argument is conceptually incorrect). See generally Jay Katz, Informed Consent: Must It
Remain a Fairy Tale, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69 (1994).
35. Ultimately, bioethical perspectives or views are shaped by the very nature of the
physician-patient relationship which, in turn, is anchored in the philosophy of medicine
which mandates that no patient harm be done by a doctor in this partnership. See THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE REBORN: A PELLEGRINO READER (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.
& Fabrice Jotterand eds., 2008). See generally MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION
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Because of the phenomenal expansion of medical technology, which
began in the mid-to-late twentieth century and has gained in momentum
since the start of this century,36 new complexities in clinical care and health
care decision-making have arisen.37 With the increased emphasis on
economics—both micro and macro—as a central vector of force in the
allocation of medical resources,38 conflicts have arisen between the role of
physicians as gatekeepers to the health care delivery system and their roles
as ethical advocates for care which best meets the needs of their patients.39
Although the hallmark of moral debates on the use and application of
biomedical ethics in policy and in practice, today, is that they are “unsettable
and interminable,”40 there should be a shared commonality of purpose and
direction within these ongoing conversations and debates. To be more
specific, “values of patient welfare and patient autonomy . . . translate into
the corresponding moral duties of beneficence and respect for persons.41
Indeed, by acknowledging and embracing “the virtue of benevolence (or the
principle of beneficence),” the integrity of “the ethical tradition of persons
united in community” is sustained and validated since this very tradition is
medicine’s ethical root system.42

	
  
ch. 1 (2003); George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 111 (2004).
36. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989).
37. Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 32.
38. See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW
MEDICINE (2008). See also George P. Smith, II, Access to Health Care: Economic,
Medical, Ethical and Socio-Legal Challenges, in HUMAN RTS. & HEALTH CARE ch. 20
(David N. Weisstub & G. P. Pinto eds., 2008).
39. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23 (1986).
40. Alasdair MacIntyre, Why is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics so
Frustrating?, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (1979). See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS
AND THE LAW, supra note 7. See also Churchill, supra note 12.
41. Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 32, at 45.
42. Id. at 46. As a maximizing principle, beneficence imposes—to one degree or
other upon each member of society—a responsibility to promote the well-being of
everyone. Whether beneficence is morally good, but not necessarily required, is subject
to current debate. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (Edward Craig general ed. 1998).
Presently, beneficence and benevolence are regarded as synonyms for charity. 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 280-81.
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IV. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Central to bioethical decision-making must be a realization that as ethical,
socio-legal, economic and medical conflicts persist in modern society,
controversies will continue to proliferate unabated. Foundational issues—
such as the role of religion in tempering or even impeding the pace of
scientific advancement and its potential for extending the limits of artificial
reproduction and genetic advancement,43 claims of a human right to health,
the equitable allocation of health care resources nationally, globally, and
during times of public health emergencies, together with the extent to which
rights of autonomy and self-determination during the end-of-life cycle—all
guarantee a vigorous bioethical discourse.44 Central to the success or the
failure of this dialogue is the question of what the proper foundation upon
which informed, bioethical debates can be undertaken? Deliberative
democracy has come into vogue, recently, and has been advanced as the
foundation upon which this dialogue can commence.45
With the central purpose of deliberative democracy being to promote the
legitimacy of collective decisions,46 this concept seeks to expand both the
number and use of deliberative forums where citizens may enter into
discourse over the contentious issues of the new Age of Biotechnology.
Through moral disagreements comes—ideally—a “manifest mutual respect”
for opposing views, or in other words, mutually respectful decisionmaking.47
Deliberative democracy, viewed as but a complement to the legislative
process, is an attractive idea. The principal drawback to its effective
implementation is that the average, ordinary, reasonable American is not
informed—sufficiently—to enter into meaningful discourse on the

	
  
43. See SHEILA A. M. MCLEAN, MODERN DILEMMAS: CHOOSING CHILDREN ch. 1
(2006); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW (1981); JOHN FLETCHER,
THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL (1974); Smith, infra note 121. See also Tim
Townsend, Bishops Not Indulgent on Infertility, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2010, at B12
(reporting on a meeting of the U.S. Catholic Bishops where a document was approved
with certain reproductive technologies, e.g., artificial insemination, being condemned as
not morally legitimate ways to combat infertility).
44. See generally J. KENYON MASON & GRAEME T. LAURIE, LAW AND MEDICAL
ETHICS (7th ed. 2006); SHEILA A.M. MCLEAN, OLD LAW, NEW MEDICINE (1998). Ethics
may be seen as but “reasoned public discourse in search of the common good.”
Pellegrino & Thomasma, supra note 32, at 34.
45. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Deliberating About Bioethics, 27 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 38 (1997).
46. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 40.
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ramifications of the new Age of Biotechnology.48 Logic is all too often put
on “hold” while emotional feelings control and often resolve the debate.49
Similarly, hard economic realities are ignored or postponed—repeatedly—
until the time their ultimate and forced implementation causes more discord
and havoc than would have occurred if they had been considered as a first
order priority.50
Stated otherwise, perhaps the greatest single reason why—even with an
ethic of openness within a deliberative democracy—little “intelligent
conversation,” let alone constructive debate, can occur at the community
level, is the inability of the public to understand the language of the
scientists; or in other words, the language of statistics.51 To be sure, the
foundations of humanity—”our sentiments, loves, attitudes, mores and
character, as well as the familial, social, religious and political institutions
that nourish and are nourished by them. . . .”52—are not anchored in
scientific rationality. Yet, conduct and decision-making must be, in a
participatory democracy, informed and guided by a level of understanding
which allows for reasonable courses of action. Given an unsophisticated
citizenry as is seen today concerning issues of medical science,
biotechnology, and finely nuanced bioethical issues, and subsequent
paralytic legislative miasmas which often occur, it remains for the judiciary
to recognize its ultimate responsibility to act to safeguard and promote the
common utilitarian good.53

	
  
48. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 112
(1990); Smith, Judicial Decision Making, supra note 21, at 103.
49. See generally SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON (2008).
50. See Stephen F. Williams, Limits to Economics As a Norm for Judicial Decision,
21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1998).
51. Robert Schwartz, Genetic Knowledge: Some Legal and Ethical Questions in
BIRTH TO DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 25 (David C. Thomasma & Thomasine
Kushner eds. 1996); Roger B. Dworkin, Bioethics? The Law and Biomedical Advance, 14
HEALTH MATRIX 43 (2004).
52. LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE OF
BIOETHICS 281 (2002). See generally MAXWELL J. CHARLESWORTH, BIOETHICS IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY (1993).
53. Schwartz, supra note 51; Dworkin, supra note 51. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY 15, 16 (2005) (stating “active liberty” is grounded in responsibility and
capacity). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(2003).
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V. TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONSTRUCTS FOR ETHICAL
DECISION-MAKING AND MORAL REASONING
Seen as a theory of personal morality and social justice, utilitarianism
promotes the maximization of “the sum total of happiness.”54 Accordingly, a
good person strives to maximize that state of happiness;55 and the good
society is one which endeavors to accommodate this quest.56 When
individuals are able to achieve a level of satisfaction from their preferential
choices of whatever character or nature, and to whatever extent possible,
then economists recognize “happiness, or utility is maximized.”57 No doubt,
one of the inherent difficulties of utilitarianism is defining utility, or
pleasure, and—as the case may be—disutility (or pain).58
“Hedonistic” and “act” utilitarianism—deriving, classically, from
consequentialist or teleological philosophies advocated by Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill—judge actions by their hedonistic effect in achieving
pleasure or avoidance of pain.59 Judged on a case-by-case basis, the morality
of each act is separated “from the consequences of a potential aggregation of
similar types of acts.”60 An act which is morally proper and causes or
promotes a “greater net utility/happiness/pleasure than other potential acts,”
is judged to be moral.61
Consequentialism utilizes a common sense analytical approach in judging
the ethical character of an action.62 Thus, the “best outcome” is one which
results in the best consequences.63 Rather than determine certain conduct to
be right or wrong—deontologically—consequentialism validates its efficacy
by advancing the notion that, in practice, most people knowingly, or
intuitively, utilize this process.64
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56. Id.
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58. JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 14 (2d ed.
2009).
59. Id.
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61. Id. While Bentham embraced pleasure as the definitive goal of conduct, Mill
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at 14, 15.
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64. Id. at 13.
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Emanuel Kant’s school of moral philosophy deviated from the BenthamMill thesis by stressing the importance and centrality of general rules.65
Termed deontological, Kantian philosophy stresses the notion that “the
principles upon which a person acts are more important than the act’s
consequences.”66 Acts are judged to be good when they harmonize duties (or
obligations) which derive from universal principles—with the first and
foremost duty being that of “acting in harmony with general moral
principles.”67 A significant issue in Kantian philosophy is that “various
apparent duties seem to conflict with each other (e.g., a duty to be truthful
versus “a duty to keep confidences.”)68
More than any other Western philosophy, utilitarianism is seen as central
to American constructs for decision-making.69 Either directly or indirectly,
“Americans resolve apparent social dilemmas with reference to the
comparative good and bad that they think will follow from a set of options,
or the ‘cost/benefit’ ratio as this sometimes translates into economic
realms.”70
In a broad sense, utilitarianism is complemented by
communitarian ethics which stress the notion that in matters of public health
policy making and medical research, for example, individual pursuits of
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67. Id. at 16.
68. Id.
69. Id. See generally Bruce N. Waller, CONSIDER ETHICS: THEORY, READINGS AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES ch. 4 (3d ed. 2010).
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unreasonable and subject to legal restraint, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827
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“the burden on the person harmed by avoiding the harm.” § 827(d)(e). The balancing
factors used in the Restatement of Torts serve, broadly, as a construct for evaluating
when conduct is, at any and all levels of social action, seen as reasonable. In this regard,
the factors have pertinence in bioethical and health care decision-making since they serve
as points of assessment for executing rational, common sense judgments—and
particularly in decisions relative to controversial scientific undertakings (e.g., IVF
research, human cloning) and end-of-life care. See George P. Smith, II, Setting Limits:
Medical Technology and The Law, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 283 (2001). See JONATHAN
BARON, AGAINST BIOETHICS ch. 3 (2006) (stressing the inelectable foundation of
utilitarianism as the preferred basis for bioethical decision-making); DOLGIN & SHEPHERD
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happiness must be compromised—or at least displaced—for the preservation
of the common good or advancement of the general welfare.71
There is, at best, a tenuous “link” between moral philosophy and modern
bioethics —this, simply because average, ordinary citizens, in contemporary
society, grapple with bioethics issues through use of theological ethics, the
social and behavioral sciences, normative legal standards, political theory,
and public health policies without resort to ethical theory. Theoretical
generalities advanced by moral philosophies are largely viewed as being
extraneous to pragmatic decision-making.72 An inherent complement to this
decision-making model is the theory of casuistry which largely discards
applying general principles to individual cases and—instead— analyzes the
facts of a particular case compared and contrasted with other similar cases in
order to resolve a conflict.73 The doctrine of precedence is central to the
casuistical method.74
Closely resembling casuistry is narrative ethics which considers patients
as far more than case histories—and, instead, sees them as individuals with
narrative histories who experience both disease and disability as elements of
life itself.75 Both casuistry and narrative ethics place emphasis on analyzing
concrete aspects of a case.76
Yet, another philosophical construct for ethical decision-making is seen in
virtue ethics which emphasize an assessment of morally correct conduct—
not the consequences of one’s actions as determinative of their
appropriateness or correctness.77 Thus, attitudes (e.g., virtues) motivating a
line of conduct are assessed carefully.78 Put simply, virtue ethics places more
importance on the character of a decision maker or health care provider than
the consequences of their action.79
	
  
71. DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 58, at 17; HERRING supra note 1. See George
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MED. & ETHICS 209 (2004). See George P. Smith, II, Policy Making and The New
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definition”). See generally Smith, Biomedicine and Bioethics, supra note 20; WALLER,
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VI. SITUATIONISM
Drawing from the works of James Gustafson,80 Paul Ramsey,81 Paul
Tillich,82 and others83 in the twentieth century, the late Joseph Fletcher—an
Anglican priest—became, perhaps, the most eloquent American proponent
of and spokesman for situationism.84 As a pragmatic and relativistic
methodology of ethics, rather than a substantive system,85 situationism
advances the proposition that there is but one law of love that is superior to
and exclusive of all moral principles and laws.86
Rather than embrace principles—although they were acknowledged as an
ethical part of all judgment—situationists de-emphasize normative behavior
and focus on context or “situations” as determinative.87 Accordingly, for
Fletcher and other situationists, “the good is what works, what is expedient,
what gives satisfaction.”88 Situationism, then, embraces a “greater good”
morality.89 What is “good” is that which leads to “human welfare and
happiness (but not, necessarily pleasure).”90
Any principle can be suspended, ignored, or even violated if, by doing so,
one “can affect more good than by following it.”91 Indeed, the very reason
for altering principles and rules is because “circumstances” (or situations)
warrant a common-sense and compassionate response not otherwise
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83. Id. at 33 (referencing, among others, the work of Dietrich Bonhoffer, Charles
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85. Id. at 36.
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87. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics under Fire, in STORM OVER ETHICS 149, 149-73
(James M. Gustafson et al., eds. 1967). See Joseph Fletcher, What’s in a Rule? A
Situationist’s View, in NORM AND CONTEXT IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 325-338 (Gene H.
Outka & Paul Ramsey eds. 1968).
88. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY, supra note 14, at 42.
89. Fletcher, Situation Ethics Under Fire, supra note 87, at 173.
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(1967).
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embraced by an a priori rule.92 Love is the only norm which is “intrinsically
good” and unalterable.93
For Fletcher, rather than adhere totally to strict pragmatism which
embraces the notion that the ends justify the means, the ends and the means
are not taken as independent entities, but “are relative to each other.”94
Thus, the means are regarded as the components necessary to a realization of
the ends.95 Accordingly, the actual result of a course of conduct is of far less
determinative value than the intended end96 (e.g., a compassionate response
to end-stage pain and suffering).
Under situationism, love is identified with justice—for, they are seen as
“one and the same thing.”97 Love, however, defies a precise definition and
is reached only “by an act of faith.”98 It is only through a particular situation
that an individual is provided with ethical judgment and, in turn, it is through
the situation that the full context of love is determined.99 Love, then, is not
prescriptive but rather situational.100 When the law and love conflict, love
must always triumph101 because the only universal ethical norm recognized
is love.102 Other than the commandment, “to love God in the neighbor,”103
situationism rejects all other norms or laws.104
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VII. LAW’S PURPOSE
There is general agreement that the principal purpose of law is not only to
define and protect individual rights and to ensure public order, but also to
resolve disputes and redistribute wealth and thereby optimize economic
efficiency.105 Additionally, laws should dispense justice, provide a structure
for preventing or compensating injury, and be “a lever for moving human
behavior.”106 Accordingly, all legal systems may be viewed correctly as
existing “to effect some change in human behavior.”107 By seeking to alter
socio-cultural influences, law can truly shape and re-shape behavior.108
As seen, law is the language of social regulation.109 Thus, it obeys
systemic imperatives often irrelevant and in conflict with efforts to achieve a
genuine understanding and wise resolution of moral issues.110 Although it
would be incorrect to hold that every moral obligation “involves a legal
duty,” it would, however, be proper to recognize “every legal duty is
founded on a moral obligation.”111 It remains for the state—through the
promulgation of laws—to determine which particular ideal of morality
should guide.112 Ideally, and of necessity, that moral standard that best
recognizes autonomy, and thereby “maximizes freedom” without harming
others, must be embraced.113 As a language, law competes with other
languages of religion and morality, of love and friendship, of custom and
compromise, and of pragmatism and social accommodation. Interestingly,
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REFORM 202 (2009).
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these other languages are spoken more comfortably, fluently, and with more
conviction in daily life than the language of law.114
VIII. SCIENCE AND RELIGION
The two great systems of human thought are science and religion, and the
predominant influence over the conduct of most individuals, historically,
may be said to be religion.115 Although there is a religious perspective
present in the lives of most individuals, religion’s stylized, institutionalized
role has declined sharply over the years. While traditional Christian
doctrines are being displaced from personal consciousness, they are not
replaced—however—by rational scientific thought; for science is just as
elusive and inaccessible to the public as organized religions.116
Because contemporary existence has been altered dramatically by
scientific achievement through technology, lives are changed radically—
with the corresponding conclusion reached that traditional religions often
appear to be lacking in modern relevance in resolving both personal and
social problems.117 The deep questions of existence are approached
differently by science and religion. While science is based on careful
observation and experimentation, which in turn allows for theories to be
constructed connecting different experiences, religion asserts unalterable
truths that cannot be modified to accommodate changing ideas.
Accordingly, the true believer stands by his faith regardless of whatever
evidence may be deduced against its efficacy.118 Yet, for the scientist, if
scientific irregularities prove a theory to be fallacious, it will be abandoned
and a new approach adopted.119
The reality of social behavior is that science and technology are the great
engines of modern times; and these engines drive and force constant change.
Far from becoming simpler, the very real promise of science and technology
is that they will become more difficult and, indeed, unyielding. Finding
definitive solutions to both the tendentious problems and the opportunities
they present is especially difficult since no “solution” can ever be taken as
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final— this is because “with changing technology comes changing
dimensions of the problems.”120
IX. BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Interestingly, a distinct positive-negative, or yin-yang, relationship exists
between science and religion that gives rise to a level of synergistic energy,
which allows both science and religion to work independently, advancing
the common good spiritually and scientifically.121 Similarly, there is an
inter-relationship between bioethics and human rights—nationally and
internationally. More specifically, the extent to which bioethics serves as a
framework, if perhaps not a foundation, for advancing a claim that there is a
human right to health care122 is illustrated clearly in recent work by
UNESCO in presenting to the United Nations a Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights in 2005.123 Others prefer to see human rights
as a lingua franca for advancing a globalized notion of bioethics and one no
longer shackled to an inflexible regime of principlism.124
In addition to the 2005 Universal Bioethics Declaration, the 1997
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, and the
2003 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data are pivotal to a new
global effort to structure a framework to advance a bioethics/human rights
constitutionalism.125 Together with the Universal Declaration of Human
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Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights contain
numerous principles and obligations which bear a direct relationship to
norms of medical ethics.126
X. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
As observed, another great issue of the moment confronting bioethics as a
discipline is the issue of distributive and social justice in health care reform,
as caution must be taken to separate the terms, “medical and health care.”
Conflation of the two often leads to confusion—this, because health care is
within the purview of a responsible polity, it is a much broader conception
which must remain second in priority of concerns and action to medical
care.127 Accordingly, primary efforts must be directed toward assuring
treatment for those in present need of it rather than shaping a national public
policy designed to cultivate an overall improved health status with the goal
of preventing future illness. Relief of suffering precedes cultivation of
health, important as the latter surely is.
In the final analysis, the goal of medical care must be to enhance the wellbeing of the patient.128 The most vexing issue in achieving this goal is to
both develop and to administer an equitable system of access to care that
balances patient autonomy with quality of life—particularly when age and
disease are more progressively incapacitating.129 Invariably, the ethics of
medical care and of healthcare are tied, inextricably, to applying micro
economic policy at the point of patient entry into the health care delivery
system and macro economics in determining the rational parameters of
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health care policy.130 In as much as health care resources are finite, they
must be rationed131 —with the consequence being that there can be no
recognized or absolute duty to provide full medical treatment for all people
at all times.132
The extent to which medical resource allocations are provided is under
ongoing review and assessment. Indeed, the standard for “codifying” the
elements of Distributive Justice is an issue of great national concern.133
Finding an acceptable unit or metric for measurement of disease burden is
exceedingly problematic and lacking in uniformity. One construct growing
in popularity for making the determination is the Quality-Adjusted Life Year
calculation—a measurement by which the quantity of life lived is computed,
statistically, in order to determine whether there is a sustainable value for a
particular medical intervention.134 Cost-effectiveness, thus, is of central
importance in this measurement. Another tool for evaluating the use of a
medical resource is found in a growing reliance on the practice of evidencebased medicine, which is a systematic process of reviewing, appraising, and
using clinical research findings to aid in the delivery of optimum clinical
patient care.135
Thus, society continues to explore various options for
measuring the disease burden to reasonably allocate medical resources.
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CONCLUSION
Once it is accepted that the provenance of the virtue of benevolence
derives properly from the principle of beneficence,136 it can then be
hypothesized that love should be the dominant vector of force in bioethical
decision-making in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, decisions should
be guided by a spirit of rational thinking137 and basic common sense which
seek, always, to direct a “caring response”138 —or, in other words, one which
is compassionate, loving, humane, and merciful,139 and that also recognizes
a right to basic dignity.140
Ethical taxonomical ambiguities should be foresworn in order to reach
reasonable and just results.141 This approach—drawn from the notion of a
“common morality”142 —seeks to re-define rather abstruse ethical and
philosophical principles and, thereby, reduce them to one common
denominator: love or benevolence. In this way, no definitive choice between
principlism and situationism is required. Rather, this interpretation allows
the principle of beneficence to serve as the foundational principle upon
which love or benevolence shape the response to individual situations in
which ethical judgments are required.143 Moreover, in a system founded on
benevolence, principlism and situationism are complementary and by no
means disharmonious. Indeed, they become inextricable in their resolve to
serve as constructs for ethical decision-making, which is in turn rational.
Moral theory, in and of itself, can never be the exclusive basis for moral
judgments144 because there can be no unified criteria to test the validity of a
moral claim. 145 Therefore, it is better to judge the morality or immorality of
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conduct based on the situation in which an issue is raised or presented for
review and determination.146 Inasmuch as cultural variants differ within
each culture or community,147 morality must be viewed as community
based—thereby defying a defined structure for problem-solving.148
Moral relativism necessitates a casuistic (or case-based) form of analysis
when ethical judgments must be made. Situationism, as presented, compels
the use of love or benevolence as the virtue of a common sense morality that
is rational and eschews a rigid or unyielding adherence to a formalistic
system codified in principlism. In making this conclusion, this Article—
while recognizing that bioethics can only frame relevant questions regarding
conflicts149—seeks to re-calibrate the “traditional” template or compass for
ethical argumentation and, in so doing, assure an active role and relevance
for bioethics in this century.150
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